Cynthia Martin

MUSLIMS IN EUROPE:
CULTURE, IDENTITY, SOCIAL EXCLUSION
AND COMMUNITY

Key words: Muslims, culture, identity, social exclusion and community.

This paper is an extended version of the lecture delivered to students at the Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Instytut Pedagogiki in November 2006, the focus of which was the increasing politicisation of ‘national’ culture and identity and social exclusion in the face of heightened tensions regarding the presence of asylum seekers and immigrants in European countries, but with particular reference to the Muslim community. I add some historical and theoretical material to strengthen the argument. The relevance of such issues relates to debates about continuing European enlargement which may potentially include Orthodox Eastern Europe (Ukraine) and Muslim South-Eastern Eurasia (Turkey), making it harder to ignore the complex divisions between different societies. Already about 10 million Muslims currently live in Western Europe. They are the largest religious minority in the region, and the third largest religion overall, and growing much faster in Western European countries than the historically dominant Catholic and Protestant churches. This makes Islam a significant social and religious force in Western Europe. It would be incorrect to see Muslims as a single monolithic ‘community’. In Britain, for example, they are the largest faith group after Christians, but more than half of Muslims were born in the UK, and have a range of ethnic backgrounds, e.g. Asian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, Arab, Afghan, Iranian, Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Kurdish, Kosovar, European North African, Somali and ‘white’ Muslims.

Anti-Muslim sentiments are growing across Europe, and this must be seen in the context of wider globalization processes. For example, the fear of a ‘Muslim invasion’ has ignited nationalist-populist movements, who perceive that national identities are being threatened by the ongoing supranational processes of European integration. In theory, free labour mobility exists within the European space for some, but new walls are being constructed to keep particular ‘others’ out. Low-wage, informal urban enclave economies, along with the proliferation of occupational ghettos on the margins of national labour market regulation and social security systems have emerged. Socially excluded ‘national’ citizens compete with socially excluded ethnic minorities and asylum seekers for ‘scarce’ national welfare resources. Thousands of national citizens, and immigrant ‘others’ subsist on ‘shrinking welfare’ and live in fragmented ‘ghettos’ in ethnically or racially segregated neighbourhoods in large European cities. Western European welfare states are undergoing deep change processes, becoming more austere, and are dismantling institutions and practices that were designed to sustain ‘inclusive’ citizenship and ‘national’ belonging. Some commentators talk of a ‘social crisis’, or a ‘social regression’. Along with the crisis of the welfare state and multiple forms of racialized exclusion, there is a growing political and cultural crisis, happening in tandem with changes occurring at the level of the nation, and established national identities. Current social justice struggles are tinged with cultural politics, expressed through the concepts ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’ or religious difference. The crisis of the nation is linked to the rise of new nationalist, racist-populist political movements, centred on the ‘problem’ of immigration. The aftermath of September 11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen a wave of suspicion and hostility directed towards Muslims, casting doubt on their loyalty as citizens. There has been widespread questioning as to whether Muslims can be and are willing to integrate into European society and its values; whether they are committed to core European values such as freedom, tolerance, democracy and so on. This has been accompanied by some impassioned talk of ‘integration’, as against multiculturalism. Add to this heady mix the fact that most of the world’s oil resources are under the control of Muslim countries. This is the context within which I present an overview of some of the current debate taking place in relation to Muslims in multicultural Europe.

Muslims in Europe – historical note

Immigration has long been central to nation-building processes, with both internal and international migrations playing a crucial role in industrialisation and urban development. Not all Western European countries have included immigration in their histories as it contradicted myths of national homogeneity. There are immigrants from nearly every part of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in Western Europe today, with newer movements from Eastern Europe. The most significant areas of origin are Turkey and North Africa. Muslims began to settle in Britain back in the 19thC as foreign workers were recruited as cheap labour for the growing industrial and seaport cities of England. The first large wave of Muslim immigrant arrived in Britain after the war, the pattern of which was rooted in British colonialism⁴. The British state did not anticipate mass migration, did not encourage foreign workers to become British citizens, but past policy allowed this to occur, and Commonwealth immigrants had access to all the rights of citizenship, which over time became more restrictive. France’s contact with Islam and Muslims are older than Britain’s. The Middle Ages and the early Modern Period was characterised by various Muslim invasions, leaving behind some Muslim settlers⁵. After the French conquest of Algeria in 1830, France gained the first of several Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan African colonies with large Muslim populations, the first large migrations occurring during World War I. This continued after World War II due to labour shortages. First generation, non-refugee Muslim immigrants viewed their stay as temporary, and during the 1960s and 70s, religious expression remained hidden. Temporary immigrants who decided to stay brought their family members to France, and integration began to be an issue, in a country that was up till now, predominantly Catholic Christian. There are about 5 million men and women of Arab origin in France. Germany has a long history of interactions with Muslims, in particular those from the Ottoman Empire. In 1732, King Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia set up an Islamic prayer room in Potsdam for some Turkish mercenaries he employed, and is reported to have said that ‘If Turks come to Berlin, mosques must be built for them’⁶. Muslims continued to live temporarily on and off in Germany for the next two centuries, and in 1925, the first mosque was constructed in Berlin, and tens of thousands of foreign Muslims fought for Germany in Wehrmacht or SS units⁷. Severe labour shortages saw Germany signing recruitment treaties with other states from the 1950s to recruit foreign workers, with Turkish workers becoming the largest immigrant population. The policy was promoted as a short term solution, and this sat alongside an ideology that Germany was not a country of immigration. The regulation of immigration is a relatively recent development, starting around the late 19thC. Government policies to regulate, or integrate immigrants date from the 1960s, and two main approaches dominated: ‘assimilation’ and ‘differential exclusion’. A multicultural approach only became significant recently⁸. National citizenship traditions have an important bearing on how countries deal with immigrants, and these are summarised below in relation to Britain, Germany and France. All of these countries have made changes to their citizenship laws.

National traditions of citizenship

Britain:

National citizenship is context-specific. The post-war reform of UK nationality legislation reflected the decline of the British Empire, and end of the ‘subject-citizenship’ dichotomy, with the establishment of a constitutional citizenship concept⁹. In a Republic, nation, state and individual identity are necessarily conflated, but modern UK constitutionalism does not deter-mine a particular British ‘identity’. ‘Britishness’ thus remains ‘a natural or social construct’. Race Relations legislation, applied by common law courts, banned discrimination on the grounds of ‘race, ethnicity or national origin’, and facilitated pluralism, and a process of cultural self-definition with different groupings and individuals applying for and receiving

---

⁷ Abdullah, Muhammad S. Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland, Cologne1981, Verlag Styria, p. 16-36.
protection on the basis of their own – rather than the state’s – perception of ethnic and national difference (Favell 1998). National identity was distanced from moral or cultural characteristics, the private sphere regulated by common law, enabling the development of a multi-racial and multicultural citizen-ship.

**Germany:**

The German empire was dissociated from the process of state formation and this meant the concept of German nation was not inherently connected to the idea of political nationhood associated with statehood. The particularities of German national history are complex, but German citizenship may be summarised as follows:

‘It is characterised, inter alia, by the separation of citizenship from nationality, the distinction between nationality and ethnic belonging (‘Staatsangehörigkeit’ as distinct from ‘Volksangehörigkeit’), and the emphasis on the cultural and the social dimension of citizenship rather than on its political significance.’

Historically, the German citizenship concept, the ‘German citizen’ can be partly defined ‘as “membership to” – in the sense of being a constituent part of – the German ethno-cultural community’. The German jus sanguinis (ethnic decent) concept of citizenship, as opposed to jus soli (place of birth) discouraged foreigners from trying to become citizens. Conditions pertaining to the acquisition of citizenship meant that original citizenship had to be renounced and this stopped many Turkish people from applying. It would have meant they lost property inheritance rights in Turkey.

**France:**

The French concept of citizenship emerged from the ancient city-state experience and the thinking of Rousseau. Cultural pluralism was neglected due to a fear of social fragmentation which might lead to the destruction of, or undermining of the French republic, and the idea of people forming groups and associations was rejected (Lefebvre 2003). The national political community is defined on the basis of the individual’s commitment to the French Republican ideal, in turn linked to the French notion that democracy is based on the ‘will of the people’ to live together. This allowed the concept to be applied to everyone who wanted to belong to the French nation, underpinned by the older revolutionary claim of political and civil equality. In other words, ‘homogenization from above’ was supposed to overcome ethnic, religious and other divergent interests. The French understanding of citizenship is, in theory, is not about ‘race’. The republican tradition affirms that historical and social constructs account for differences between societies, rather than natural, biological or physiological aspects. This meant immigrant and refugee children born on French soil could acquire French citizenship. By the end of the 19thC, there were two attitudes towards granting citizenship to immigrants which divided French society – whether to integrate (assimilate) them into French society, or to cast them out – at least those, who have now come to be known as les francais de papier. After the decolonisation of Algeria, problems arose as to what should be done about the large Muslim groups, in particular, Algerians, who were denied citizenship and citizenship rights during colonisation, when they lived on ‘French’ soil. Citizenship law transformed second-generation immigrants into French citizens.

**Models of integration and the citizenship experience of the Muslim population**

On the basis of historical citizenship traditions and comparison, Castles & Miller (2003) divide immigration countries into three typologies that explain public policy approaches to immigration. Religious identity in all three country examples can often mobilise as a ‘faith community’ to gain greater accommodation of needs from public institutions and other organisations.

**Multiculturalism:**

Britain fits the multicultural model, which implies that immigrants should be granted equal rights in all areas of society, without the expectation of having to give up their diversity. Membership of civil society, in theory, leads to full participation in a pluralist society. The US laissez-faire approach to this model accepts cultural difference and the existence of ethnic communities, but denies a role for the state in ensuring social justice or the support/maintenance of ethnic cultures. Another variant, represented by Sweden, sees multiculturalism as implying the willingness of the majority group to accept cultural

---

difference and state action to secure equal rights for minorities. France and Germany are have not been accommodating to ethnic minority cultural expression. British multiculturalism is evidenced by an era of reasonably secure relations. British Muslims are present in parliament and receive state funding for faith schools. Muslim newspapers and magazines have flourished, and London has become the centre of an Islamic financial industry. Accommodation has been made regarding cultural dress codes, e.g. muslim dress and Seik turbans, the latter accommodation allowing access to work which requires headgear (motor cycle riders, police). According to A. Sivanandan, director of the Institute of Race Relations in Britain, cultural diversity was the result of ‘unified struggle, across communities, ethnic groups, faiths and locales’, leading to the introduction of antidiscrimination legislation in the various Race Relations Acts. Such an understanding of multiculturalism during the 1970s ‘encouraged schools to teach children to respect each other’s cultures and religions and celebrate each other’s festivals’. Such successes were instrumental in forming multiculturalism as an institutionalised government policy, the roots of which were ‘anti-racism’. Sivanandan now argues that this process stripped multiculturalism of its anti-racist roots: ‘it ceased to be an outcome of the struggle for equality emanating from below, and became government policy imposed from above…..the anti-racist component of the struggle ebbed’ with multiculturalism denigrating into ‘culturalism’ or ‘ethnicism’. It became part of a competitive fight for funds and favours from central and local government. The problem then became one of ‘individual prejudice’ and ‘ethnic disadvantage’, rather than one of institutionalised racism across societies institutions, which had exclusionary effects. Funding the projects of ethnic and religious groups had, on this view, staved off protests about inequality and injustice. Groups were set against each other in a bid for funds. With racism taken ‘out of the equation’, all that is left is ‘culturalism and ethnicism’, so it is not surprising we find cultural and ethnic enclaves with their own cultural and ethnic politics. The argument here is that multiculturalism only becomes progressive if racism is actively combated; if racism is tackled in structural terms, rather than seen just as a ‘personal’ thing.

**Differential exclusion / guest worker system:**

In contrast\(^\text{11}\), view that Germany fits a differential exclusionary model, sometimes referred to as a ‘guestworker’ regime, generally applied to guest-worker recruiting countries. Guestworkers (temporary) in Germany were not granted secure residence status, and this corresponded to the ideological denial of being a country of immigration. Immigrants were incorporated into the labour market, as part of civil society, but denied access to full participation in social, cultural and political relations. This impacted on the education of Turkish children – many Turkish families committed them-selves to staying, but as it was assumed they would all go back to their country of origin, educational development and opportunity for Turkish children, or the development of any kind of multiculturalism in schools was denied (Rex 1992). The reality is that hundreds of thousands of Turkish guestworkers became permanent settlers. The Turkish population is fragmented on religious and ethnic lines, with hundreds of competing Turkish associations of different kinds. Turks in Germany are not held together as ‘a community by common values and goals’ but rather the feeling of ethnicity is based on common origins, and the experience. The Basic Law protects the religious freedom, but Muslims are not accorded equal standing, i.e. public corporation status, with other religious groups who receive state funds. As in Britain, some cultural practices may clash with law, e.g. family law, burial regulations, the slaughter of animals, the public recognition of religious holidays, and so on (Fetzer & Soper 2005:109). The acceptance that guestworkers are in Germany to stay has seen gradual accommodations to the Muslim population, e.g. the growth of mosques or Islamic prayer rooms. Inherited church-state relations both in Germany and in Britain, suggest that Muslims could expect some accommodation by the state in this respect.

**Assimilation:**

Finally, the assimilationist model\(^\text{12}\)  exhibits a policy of incorporating migrants into society through a process of ‘one-way’ adaptation. The expectation is that immigrants will surrender their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics, and absorb into the dominant culture of the state and nation, therefore, cultural integration. The state maintains the conditions that facilitate this process. It is assumed that integration into the ‘political community’ as French citizens will bring about cultural integration. French governments attempted to persuade North African immigrants to return home by offering financial inducements, but this largely failed, making France one of the most multi-ethnic societies on the continent, and many organisations have emerged to help immigrants, and some private Muslim schools have appeared

---

along with some mosques and prayer facilities. The government ban official statistics based on ethnicity or religion, with the result that it is not even clear how many Muslims live in France. At the same time, France’s integration, or ‘assimilationist’ policy is regarded as a failure. Muslims in France would appear to be organizationally unified and more politically mobilized than British Muslims, for example, but they find it very difficult to obtain particular benefits or exceptions from the state that would reflect their cultural diversity. French policy on state accommodation of religious practices is governed by laïcité (a form of separation of church and state) and a ‘strict’ form is supported by feminists and major teachers’ unions in France. Islam claims to regulate public and private lives, and as such, is an ideological foe in France. Religious or ethnic enclaves in France cause alarm – they are not supposed to exist in a nation that views itself as indivisible, and able to assimilate its diverse elements. The French would say that ‘separatism’ is unacceptable, and point to what is happening ‘multicultural’ Britain.

**Political developments – The new ‘security’ environment**

Terrorist outbreaks by Islamic jihadists has had profound implications for peaceful relations in multicultural societies (Blick et al 2006). New security laws and other ‘control’ measures have increased anxiety and alienation within the Muslim population. Traditional support for the present New Labour government has fast dwindled in the new ‘security’ environment, with deep concern about the radicalisation among Britain’s Muslim citizens. After the 7/7 bombing, it was discovered that suicide bombers were wholly British, and the subsequent introduction of tough anti-terror measures have impacted adversely upon the Islamic community, turning them into objects of suspicion and facilitated a climate of Islamophobic discourse, which was already present in other parts of Europe. The combi-nation of this, and the experience of various forms of exclusion, ignited an already volatile situation. Multiculturalism has always raised controversy, but now, it is being argued that ‘multiculturalism’ is dead, that cultural pluralism has gone too far, threatening British ‘values’ and national safety. A mounting campaign against multiculturalism by politicians and the press in Britain, has strengthened the idea that there is one dominant culture, one unique set of values, one nativist loyalty, subsuming the cultural heritage of all immigrants with ‘Britishness’. This resonates with the voices of other significant groups who call for a return to assimilationist policies. The current prime minister stresses the values of ‘tolerance’ and ‘democracy’. However, the British media and opportunist politicians have undermined mutual tolerance, and cultural expression especially since the bombings (Sivanandan 2006). Similar developments have happened in most European countries.

The rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National Party has contributed to a hardening of views on immigrants. Islamist terror in 1995, and rising crime (blamed on immigrants), exacerbated the already tense relations between ethnic French and those of North African origin. North African and Sub-Saharan Muslims have experienced a virulent hostility, with many French citizens viewing that they cannot, fundamentally be assimilated. Working-class Muslims have reacted against rejection and created a counter-culture of protest, most recently manifested in rebellions in large cities, embraced fundamentalist Islam, or engaged in violent protest against the French state. For Pierre Tévanian, who wrote a book about the Muslim veil, the issue brought to the surface ‘an ingrained postcolonial racism that crosses all social divides and political formations, even the most progressive’ (Bouteldja 2006). Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government is reported to be concerned about Islamic radicalisation across Europe and the ‘underclass’ of disillusioned young Muslims (mostly Turks) in Germany. Integration of Ger-many’s Muslim population has become an important issue. New immigrants who remain permanently in Germany are expected to attend integration courses. The failure to so will do impact adversely on the extension of residency permits and social welfare benefits13. Similar developments have taken place across Europe. Differing histories, political cultures and legal systems impact on the way the issues are conceptualised in each country. Regardless of which approach, or combinations of approaches is taken to deal with immigrants outline above, it is clear that ethnic group formation takes place everywhere, ‘but under conditions which vary considerably [leading] to different outcomes’, e.g. acceptance as part of a pluralist society, or marginalization and exclusion.

---

Social exclusion

Various categories of national populations experience social exclusion and marginalisation. The European Union’s Poverty Programme from the early 1990s defined ‘social exclusion’ as the ‘negation of citizenship’: that is, the substantial negation of the right and actual ability to participate as ‘full member of the community’ (Marshall 1950), reflected in the social contract upon which liberal democratic national welfare states were typically founded (Dahrendorf 1985). It is now clear that not everyone enjoyed full citizenship. Current competitive pressures in the global economy has accentuated existing inequalities and created new ones in relation to labour markets across the world (Jose 2003). For years, Muslims living in European countries have been disproportionately among the lowest-paid, unemployed and underemployed. According to Castles & Davidson (2000) various processes combine to exclude certain groups from mainstream society. For example, legal factors, which can result in direct discrimination regarding legal status, the denial of civil rights, institutionalized discrimination, and so on. In contemporary France, for example, Muslim youths see discrimination preventing them from getting ahead. This was the case during a period of mass labour recruitment to Western Europe between the 1960s and 1970s. Despite about 5 million men and women of Arab origin living in France, this community has no representatives in parliament. Legal rules in political, civil and social spheres have had an exclusionary impact on migrants. Economic globalisation and demographic pressures are making inward migration a fact of life for EU Member States and this is producing new status hierarchies and new forms of legal exclusion for migrants. According to Morris (2002). Secondly, economic factors which force migrants into inferior labour market situations make it almost impossible for them or their descendants to move upwards.

Thirdly, spacial and social factors, which relate to the concentration of minorities in particular regions and cities. In France, there are about 700 ‘banlieues’, or suburbs, where immigrants, notably from former North African colonies have been housed since the 1960s. The banlieues are blighted by bad schools and endemic unemployment. Immigrant children and grandchildren are stuck in these areas, alienated, with commentators talking of an ‘alienated underclass’ that is increasingly identified through religion. Riots and disturbances in northern British towns have frequently erupted, and the 2001 British Cantle report suggested that white and minority ethnic communities appeared to be living ‘parallel lives’. Last year, the head of the Commission for Racial Integration warned that Britain was ‘sleepwalking into segregation’. It is not surprising that politicians of both main political parties in Britain have taken up the idea of Muslim ‘apartheid’ or ‘separateness’ in the context of terrorism, which has tended to drive Muslims more towards their own communities. There is however, no evidence to suggest that Muslims ‘self segregate’. Those who can afford a better life move out of chronically deprived inner cities, but given the longstanding ethnic inequalities in access to power and resources, and widespread discrimination, this is not an option for many. In sociological terms, class, ‘race’ and poverty intersect, with racism preventing mobility for many.

Lastly, cultural factors have a bearing on exclusionary processes. Individual integration is fairly easy for highly skilled immigrants who are not subjected to processes of segmented labour markets and residential segregation. Those with poor skills are most disadvantaged and experience the most discrimination and exclusion. This often provokes a response whereby group culture becomes a very important resource for survival and resistance. Cultural and other social type associations provide a means of preserving language and folklore, and this is most evident in concentrated residential areas. Cultural reassertion often reinforces the ‘racialization’ of minorities, and adds to the fears of local populations. It is not surprising then that issues of language, religion and dress become issues of conflict or threat, giving impetus to demands for ‘assimilation’. The wearing of the hijab (scarf, veil) by Muslim girls in schools became highly politicised in 2003, when a huge row broke out – l’affaire du foulard – and within a year, it was outlawed in state schools in France, and soon became a highly contested issue in most European cities. The dress code of Muslim women made headlines across Europe. Germany’s most populous state, North-Rhine Westphalia, recently joined another seven states in banning the headscarf in schools, and half of the 16 federal states in Germany have it in public buildings and while performing state jobs. French Muslim girls report that wearing the headscarf means they are denied employment. In Britain, acceptable levels of Muslim dress were negotiated with Muslim groups for the purpose of school uniforms, but such issues have been highly politicised, and as in other European countries, the matter has ended up in the Courts. Recently, a British Airways female employee was sacked for wearing a silver cross around her neck. Any kind of religious symbol not is being seen as a ‘threat’. The Muslim headscarf has widely been seen in the West as a religious/political symbol that stands for the suppression of women, but research contradicts this view. Such forms of cultural exclusion in relation to the Muslim population, combined with other forms of social, political and cultural exclusion, often leads to mobilisation on the basis of ‘ethnic belonging’ which can
engender fears about separatism and fundamentalism. In any case, multilingual and multicultural divisions do not necessary correspond with the political and social divisions characteristic of the majority population. The experience of being a minority is defined through racism, exclusion and disadvantage. Ethnic mobilisation is one way of creating the conditions for societal participation.

The evidence is overwhelming that discrimination and social and economic deprivation remain central to the experience of Muslims living in Britain, Germany and France. The European Network Against Racism (ENAR) public periodic ‘shadow’ reports which confirm this. Muslims in the UK are disproportionately represented in the most deprived urban communities (Blick et al 2006), and a similar situation prevails in other European cities. Desperately bad housing conditions, overcrowding, child poverty, few adults in work, poor qualifications, or none at all, are highlighted, with those who have degrees suffering discrimination in employment. Discrimination on the grounds of religion adds to the sense of alienation. Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism has increased since the electoral successes of right-wing and/or xenophobic parties and advantage has been taken of the recent bombings or bomb scares in European cities. Instances of verbal abuse, physical violence, police ‘stop and search’, have been reported in Britain, where the climate is now one of ‘suspicion’. ‘Race hate’ assaults on Muslims have greatly increased, as has religious discrimination from public bodies, with many fearing attack because of their skin colour. Sociological literature asserts that the most important factor in explaining differences in life chances and the living circumstances of migrants is the negative impacts of racial or ethnic labels, i.e. ascribing undesirable characteristics to a groups which assigns them to inferior social positions. The term ‘ethnicity’ is a fairly recent ‘construct’. European groups defined as ‘ethnic’ have been inferiorized in relation to the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ which served as the norm. In post-war Britain, ‘ethnic group’ became embedded in the concept of ‘minorities’, with ‘coloured’ people being discursively re-invented as ‘ethnics’, yet ‘ethnic’ groups of European descent were rarely invoked in these terms.

Multiple identities in multi-cultural societies

Britain has long been a heterogeneous or multi-cultural nation, but the political classes have great difficulty in accepting the idea that people can hold multiple identities and loyalties, but Blick et al’s research shows that Muslims are at ease with their various identities, e.g.

‘I am absolutely British. I am absolutely Pakistani. I am absolutely Muslim. I am all of these’ (trainee auditor).

Muslim youths in French suburbs see no contradiction between being French and having foreign roots. It is others that do. Some of the tensions Pakistanis in Britain experience relate to what they perceive as ‘decadent’ western society, and they find security living within their own community. Muslims do not like being asked to ‘choose’ between a Muslim and a British identity (Blick et al 2006), and that is precisely what is being asked of them by the British government. They believe that such a loyalty ‘test’ is misguided and unfair, since nationality and religion are not mutually exclusive: ‘why should I choose?’ asks one person, ‘Nobody asks you to choose between being a “Church of England” and a “British”’. The British government is setting the boundary of what it means to be British (‘our way of life’, as Tony Blair puts it), and Muslims feel they are being asked to fit into that system or be left out. However, they point out the number of years they have been in Britain already, and how they already feel ‘British’. The issue of ‘identity’, or recognition of ethnic difference is really a case of ‘misrecognition’, according to Frazer (2000). It takes away from structural inequalities in society and reduces issues of social exclusion to ‘identity’ politics. Essentializing identities ignores the reality of the impact of transcultural flows, and treats cultures as sharply bounded, neatly separated and not interacting. Rather, the focus should be directed towards the effects of institutionalised norms and the ways these prevent people from acquiring equal social status, i.e. equal social interaction in the life of a society.

Discussion and Conclusion

Ethnocultural diversity, along with persistent practices of differentiation and racialization continues to grow, raising new questions for which we have no ready-made answers. The headscarf and veil issue, which extended into debates on the burka, intertwined seamlessly with issues of law and order, women’s oppression and international terrorism. It is argued that governments and the media have contributed to the
hysteria over Muslim dress, with many commentators agreeing with Bouteldja (2006) in saying that ‘politicians search for scapegoats for social problems and pretexts to legislate in the “war on terror”’

Progressive voices argue that the best way to prevent marginalization and social conflict is to grant permanent immigrants full rights in all social spheres, even if this means a ‘dual citizenship’ policy, which suggests breaking the link between citizenship and ethnic origin, which itself has implications for how the nation-state is defined. The idea of ‘ethnicity’ is central to discourses of the nation: nationalism relates to feelings of belonging to a group united by common ‘racial’, linguistic and historical ties, usually identified with a particular territory. Nationalism is also a corresponding ideology that exalts the nation-state as the ideal form of political organization which claims the loyalty of its citizens. Nationalism in the past has assumed aggressive, intolerant forms, relating to military and trade rivalries and national expansion – imperialism, therefore subjugation and financial exploitation. Contemporary, right wing, populist national currents would agree with France’s right wing-interior minister’s statement that mass regularisation of immigrants should be stopped (The Irish Times 2006), that immigrants should be sent back to where they came from. Yet others argue that the solution lies in changing the international rules of trade promoted by the World Bank, allowing underdeveloped countries equal access to western markets.

The recent turn towards ‘forced’ assimilation does not make the issue of communication across cultures disappear. Migration is likely to continue, as will be the presence of ethnic communities in our communities. Globalization is leading to multiple identities and a more ‘transnational belonging’, raising questions as how divided societies can be healed and how nations respond to cultural diversity. Might multi-cultural citizenship be the best solution to defining nation-state membership in a world characterised by increasing mobility? Castles & Miller (2003:45) suggest an additional ‘ideal type’ of citizenship may be emerging – a transnational model, one within which social and cultural identities transcend national boundaries with ‘multiple and differentiated forms of belonging’. If democracy is to survive in a globalized world where much political and economic power is shifting to international agencies and transnational corporations, and not subject to democratic control, then ways must be found of including people with multiple identities in various political communities. The central principle of the democratic state is that all members of civil society should be part of the political community, which in turn implies granting full citizenship to permanent residents. If insistence is placed on the idea of ‘national identities, then we must consider what type of national identity can foster social unity through cultural diversity (Uberol 2007).

According to Geddes et al (2004), if Europe is to live up to its founding values of equality and openness, then it must look closer at its policies governing inclusion and civic citizenship. A recent cross-cultural group of prominent world figures (Alliance of Civilisations, created by Kofi Annan), including Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami, called for urgent efforts to heal the growing divide between Muslim and Western societies. They argued that the chief causes of the rift are not religion or history, but rather, recent political developments, and in particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They also state that other Western military interventions in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, contribute significantly to a growing sense of resentment and mistrust of Muslim populations, and also by Muslim groups who are reluctant to place faith in the state. The pace of reform in some Muslim countries is very slow and this is said to be a key factor in the rise of extremism. A recent report on social cohesion in multi-cultural Europe, stressed that we must transcend the limits of so-called ‘integration’ policies that do not acknowledge migrants and their descendants as ‘partners in decisions concerning them’; that we must think beyond ‘alleged’ cultural incompatibility, and reflect on the combined effects of exclusion stemming from social policy and immigration policy, employment and nationality. Many countries are now introducing ‘intercultural competency’ programmes in school, and this it is argued, can only be positive, and help facilitate social cohesion and the political inclusion of migrants in the European public arena. The European dilemma for Schierup et al (2006:6) and others is whether there will be ‘genuine political will’ and a corresponding reshaping of institutional capacity that will ‘breach the gap between inclusive rhetoric and exclusive realpolitik’. A post-cold war Western European rhetoric of ‘democracy’, ‘civil society’, and increasingly global ‘human rights’ has at times served to elevate the ‘West’ from the ‘Rest’ (Hall 1992). This does not sit easily with the current illiberal handling of ethnic minorities, migrants and asylum seekers who seek to enter the EU, raising questions as to how such moral and political problems will be solved as we move into the twenty-first century. This is linked to issues of ‘European’ citizenship, and ‘fortress Europe’, which requires the situation of some 12-13 million third country nationals to be addressed and who permanently reside in the EU. Such issues highlight the tension between the state as an exclusionary community, the EU as a citizenship area granting certain rights for some people and not others, and citizenship, as a more universal status. There are those who argue that
multicultural citizenship is the way forward, the more radical of whom argue that this must go along with a fairer redistribution of the world’s resources.

MUZUŁMANIE W EUROPIE: KULTURA, TOŻSAMOść, WYKLUCZENIE SPOŁECZNE, WSPÓŁNOTA

Słowa kluczowe: Muzułmanie, kultura, tożsamość, wykluczenie społeczne, wspólnota.

Streszczenie

Toczące się współcześnie dyskusje o możliwości rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej o kraje muzułmańskie (np. Turcja) oraz staly, duży napływ imigrantów z tych krajów na teren UE (w chwili obecnej mieszka tu ok. 10 milionów muzułmanów) powoduje, że nie można zagadnienia ich obecności w Europie traktować jako problemu nieistotnego i marginalnego. Muzułmanie mieszkający w Europie nie są jednolitą grupą, pochodzą z różnych krajów i różnych środowisk. Jako imigranci najczęściej należą do grona ubogich mieszkańców danego kraju, a potęgujący się współcześnie kryzys społeczny powoduje, że ubodzy rdzeni obywatelke zachodniej Europy postrzegają społeczność muzułmańską jako „rywala” w wyścigu po coraz mniejszą pomoc finansową ze strony państwa. Dyskusje dotyczą także zakresów integracji i przyzwolenia na wielokulturowość oraz wpływu boga-tych państw muzułmańskich na gospodarkę światową.

W artykule, po zarysowaniu historii emigracji muzułmanów na teren UE oraz krótkim omówieniu narodowych tradycji „obywateństwa” w krajach takich jak Wielka Brytania, Niemcy i Francja, autorka koncentruje się na wybranych aspektach problemu obecności muzułmanów w Europie, analizując szczególnie modele integracji i doświadczenia obywatelskie społeczności muzułmańskiej w poszczególnych krajach. Szczególną uwagę zwraca na model wielokulturowości w Wielkiej Brytanii, model niemiecki, w którym dla imigrantów dostępny jest tylko rok pracy, ale są wykluczeni z udziału w szerszym życiu społecznym, oraz model asymilacji preferowany we Francji. Kolejne zagadnienie poruszane przez autorkę to problem poczucia wykluczenia społecznego u muzułmanów, związanego szczególnie z tendencjami rozszerzenia działań gwarantujących bezpieczeństwo obywatelskie, które narodziły się po atakach terrorystycznych z 11 września. W końcowej części artykułu autorka rozważa zasadność przyjęcia modelu wielokrotnej tożsamości dla muzułmańskich imigrantów w Europie (ilustrując go wypowiedzią jednego z nich: Jestem w pełni Brytyjczykiem, Jestem w pełni Pakistańczykiem, Jestem w pełni muzułmaninem. Jestem każdym z nich), zwłaszcza tych żyjących w kraju tak wielokulturowym jak Wielka Brytania. Jako rozwiązanie problemów marginalizacji i sposob na rozwiązanie konfliktów społecznych proponuje ideę przyznania długotermin muzułmańskim imigrantom pełni praw obywatelskich oraz podwójnego obywatelstwa i zaakceptowanie modelu „wielokrotnej tożsamości”. Działania takie powinny być wspierane przez decyzje umożliwiające bardziej sprawiedliwą niż współcześnie dystrybucję światowych dóbr oraz działania edukacyjne, budujące kompetencje międzykulturowe.

(streszczenie Ewa Domagała-Zyśk)

References

1. Abdullah Muhammad S. Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland, Cologne 1981, Verlag Styria.